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Rethinking Equality and Difference:
Disability Discrimination in Public
Transportation
Martha T. McCluskey
People with physical disabilities' in the United States have faced, and
continue to struggle against, many social and economic disadvantages.
Over the years, laws have explicitly excluded people with disabilities from
holding public office,' serving on juries,3 marrying,4 working in certain
occupations,5 bearing children,' attending school,7 and even from being
seen on public streets.8 Even today, people with disabilities are "substan-
1. This Note will use the term "disability" in place of "handicap." Although there is disagree-
ment about which term is preferable, many people believe "handicap" carries connotations of inferior
status. The phrase "people with disabilities" in place of "disabled people" or "the disabled" empha-
sizes that people should not be reduced to their disabilities. See NATIONAL EASTER SEAL SOc',
PORTRAYING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES IN THE MEDIA § I (undated).
This Note uses "disability" to include all physical disabilities covered by § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B) (West Supp. 1988). Section 504 covers any person who
has, is regarded as having, or has a record of having a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of that person's major life activities. Id. Some examples of disabilities in-
cluded in this definition are hearing impairments, epilepsy, visual impairments, and neuromotor
impairments.
The discussion in this Note will be limited to physical disabilities, since the issue of equality for
people with mental disabilities may raise somewhat different questions. For a discussion of equality in
the context of mental disability, see Comment, We Have Met the Imbeciles and They Are Us: The
Courts and Citizens With Mental Retardation, 65 NEB. L. REV. 768 (1986).
2. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shea v. Cocking, 66 Mont. 169, 213 P. 594 (1923) (overturning city's
disqualification of judge for blindness).
3. See, e.g., Kaiser, Juries, Blindness, and the Juror Function, 60 CHI. KENT L. REV. 191
(1984) (professor, excluded from jury service because of his blindness, arguing against excluding peo-
ple who are blind from jury service).
4. At least 17 states have prohibited persons with epilepsy from marrying. Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class"
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA C.ARA LAW. 855, 861 (1975) (citing Perr, Epilepsy
and the Law, 7 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 280, 289 (1958)).
5. See, e.g., King-Smith v. Aaron, 317 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Pa. 1970), rev'd, 455 F.2d 378 (3d
Cir. 1972) (dismissing claims of teacher denied eligibility for employment in public schools by state
statute because of her blindness).
6. As recently as 1980, four states (Delaware, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and South Carolina) had
statutes authorizing the sterilization of persons with epilepsy. Developments in the Law-The Consti-
tution and the Family: Procreative Rights 93 HARV. L. REV. 1296, 1297 & n.13 (1980).
7. In 1975, Congress found that one million children with disabilities were excluded from the
public school system. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, CLEARINGHOUSE PUB. No. 81, ACCOMMO-
DATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 27 (1983) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(4) (1982))
(finding is part of statute).
8. A Chicago ordinance prohibited persons who were "diseased" or "deformed" so as to be "un-
sightly or disgusting object[s]" from exposing themselves to public view on streets or in other public
places. CHICAGO, ILL., MUM. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1973), quoted in Burgdorf & Burgdorf,
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tially worse off on almost any indicator of well-being [including education,
employment, and earnings] than are the non-disabled."' One survey found
that 50% of people with disabilities aged sixteen and over had household
incomes for 1984 of $15,000 or less, compared to 25% of nondisabled
people.10
To alleviate some of the problems confronted by people with disabili-
ties, Congress enacted section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in federally
funded programs." Congress modeled section 504 on civil rights legisla-
tion that prohibits race and sex discrimination. 2
Despite the similarity of section 504 to race and sex discrimination leg-
islation, and despite the similar problems addressed by these laws, courts
and lawmakers interpreting section 504 have often departed from the race
and sex discrimination model. In contrast to race and sex discrimination
doctrine, disability discrimination law generally assumes that physical dif-
ference, not prejudice, is the primary problem. This Note argues, how-
ever, that prejudice is central to the problems faced by people with disa-
bilities. The failure to recognize this prejudice leaves disability
discrimination doctrine confused and inadequate.
This Note will focus on federal nondiscrimination regulations gov-
erning public transportation as an example of the problems with current
disability discrimination doctrine. Public transportation has been a major
target of the reform efforts of disability rights groups.13 Access to public
supra note 4, at 863-64 (also referring to similar statutes in Columbus, Ohio and Omaha, Neb.).
9. R. BURKHAUSER & R. HAVEMAN, UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE DISABLED AND
EMPLOYMENT HANDICAPPED 15 (International Institute of Management/Labor Market Policy Dis-
cussion Paper No. 84-4a, 1984).
10. Louis HARRIS & Assoc., INC., STUDY No. 854009, THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED
AMERICANS: BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 23 (1986). People of color
who have disabilities are particularly likely to have incomes below the poverty line. B. WOLFE, IM-
PACTS OF DISABILITY AND SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS 26 (Wisconsin University Institute for Re-
search on Poverty Discussion Paper No. 539, 1979).
11. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1988), as amended by Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 45 (1988). Section 504 states: "No otherwise qualified individual
with handicaps. . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance . . . ." Id.
12. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6373, 6390. The language is similar to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides
that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), as amended by
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 46 (1988).
No federal statute prohibits disability discrimination by private employers who do not receive fed-
eral funds or contracts. Disability is not included in title VII, which prohibits discrimination in pri-
vate employment on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin, or religion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
-2000e-17 (1982).
13. For a discussion of litigation concerning access to public transportation, see R. KATZMANN,
INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED 155-85
(1986). Transportation has also been the focus of much protest activity. See, e.g., Wheelchair War-
riors, TIME. Oct. 12, 1987, at 33 (protesters arrested at transit agency convention).
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transportation is crucial for assuring access to employment, political activ-
ity, education, shopping, and recreation. Moreover, this is an area where
frequent changes in the law have heightened the questions concerning the
meaning of equality in the disability context.1 4
Section I of this Note will show how the emphasis on difference instead
of prejudice has shaped disability discrimination doctrine. This Section
will then draw on insights from sex discrimination theory to demonstrate
that pervasive prejudice against people with disabilities exists even though
it may be difficult to recognize, and that perceptions about difference are
socially constructed and influenced by this prejudice. Section II will argue
that biased assumptions concerning difference have resulted in the devel-
opment of inadequate public transportation regulations under section 504.
Finally, Section III will suggest that disability discrimination doctrine
would be strengthened by adhering more closely to the disparate impact
model, which can remedy the subtle prejudice that makes the "differ-
ences" of disability so disadvantageous.
I. ADDRESSING DIFFERENCE WITHIN EQUALITY DOCTRINE
A. Separating Prejudice from Difference
Traditional legal approaches to achieving equality have aimed at elimi-
nating prejudice. The equal treatment principle, incorporated in race and
sex discrimination doctrine, holds that "similarly situated" people must be
treated alike.1 5 Courts and Congress recognize that widespread prejudice
against racial minorities and women often causes irrational and harmful
perceptions of differences between groups that are actually "similarly situ-
ated" for most legitimate purposes.1 In current doctrine, real race differ-
ences, such as skin color, are almost always irrelevant to any legitimate
purpose. 17 Courts similarly believe that differentiation based on sex is
usually based on prejudice; in comparison to the race context, however,
courts are more likely to believe that real sex differences, such as preg-
People with disabilities who have difficulty using public transportation are present in one out of
eight households in the urban United States. GREY ADVERTISING, SUMMARY REPORT OF DATA
FROM NATIONAL SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION HANDICAPPED PEOPLE 16 (1978) (Report for De-
partment of Transportation).
14. See infra Section II-A.
15. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (equal pro-
tection clause essentially directs "that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike") (citation
omitted).
16. "Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect racial prejudice than
legitimate public concerns .... " Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citation omitted)
(overturning state court's denial of custody of child to mother based on her interracial marriage).
17. "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can
be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272
(1979) (citations omitted).
1988]
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nancy, sometimes provide legitimate reasons to distinguish between
people."8
To discourage differentiation based on prejudice, unequal treatment on
the basis of race or sex is prohibited by federal statutes"9 and is subject to
heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause.20 In addition to the
equal treatment doctrine, courts have interpreted some statutes prohibiting
race and sex discrimination to incorporate a disparate impact approach to
discrimination."' This doctrine prohibits not just explicitly unequal treat-
ment, but also facially neutral treatment that has unnecessary unequal
effects.22 Like the equal treatment principle, disparate impact is designed
to eliminate differentiation based on prejudice, but disparate impact goes
beyond equal treatment to reach subtle forms of prejudice and the effects
of past unequal treatment. s
In contrast to both the race and sex contexts, most courts and commen-
tators perceive that the real physical differences related to disability are
frequently relevant to the ability to function in society, and that real dif-
ferences, not false, prejudice-based perceptions of difference, are therefore
the primary cause of the relative disadvantages of people with disabili-
ties.24 Most agree that if section 504 simply required equal treatment of
18. In constitutional equal protection claims, sex-based classifications are less suspect than race-
based classifications. See infra note 20. The Supreme Court "has consistently upheld statutes where
the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not
similarly situated in certain circumstances." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)
(citations omitted) (upholding gender-based statutory rape law).
19. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (title VII
prohibits disparate treatment, which occurs when some people are treated less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Classifications based on race violate the equal protection
clause unless they are necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling and legitimate government
interest. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. at 432-33. Gender classifications must be substantially related to
an important government objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Supreme Court
has not decided whether classifications based on physical disability deserve heightened scrutiny under
the equal protection clause, although it has ruled that classifications based on mental retardation do
not. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
21. Courts developed the disparate impact doctrine to interpret title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Disparate impact doctrine has been used
under other nondiscrimination statutes, including title VI, the model for § 504. See Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) (plurality) (regulations implementing title VI can prohibit
disparate impact discrimination). The Supreme Court has rejected the disparate impact approach for
equal protection claims. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. To make a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that a policy or practice
has a disparate effect on a protected group compared to other groups. The defendant then must prove
that the policy is necessary or manifestly related to a legitimate interest. Finally, if the defendant
meets this burden, the plaintiff must then prove that alternative policies, without the adverse effect,
will adequately serve the same business interest. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977).
23. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHil. L. REv. 235, 299 (1971) (one
justification for prohibiting facially neutral criteria with harmful differential effects on blacks is that
these criteria may often be the functional equivalent of race); Rebell, Structural Discrimination and
the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEo. L.J. 1435, 1450 (1986) (in race discrimination context, disparate
impact analysis helps overcome effects of decades of intentional discrimination).
24. For example, the Supreme Court has said that sex, like race, differs from physical disability
because sex is a characteristic that "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
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people with disabilities and nondisabled people, it would fail to address
the particular disadvantages faced by people with disabilities. 5 For exam-
ple, the predominant view is that equal access to public transportation
does not simply mean giving people who use wheelchairs equal opportu-
nity to use the stairs on a bus. Accordingly, courts have generally adopted
a "reasonable accommodation" approach to section 504." Reasonable ac-
commodation goes beyond a simple equal treatment principle to require
changes in some practices and structures to alleviate the disadvantageous
effects of physical differences, but does not require accommodations that
impose "undue administrative and financial burdens" or that would re-
quire a "fundamental alteration in the nature of [a] program."27
Yet the question of how much accommodation section 504 requires re-
mains subject to conflict and confusion.28 This Note advocates the ap-
proach adopted by a few decisionmakers who have interpreted section
504, following the disparate impact model from race and sex discrimina-
tion law, to require, in general, a goal of integrated, equally effective pro-
grams for people with disabilities and nondisabled people.2"
Many courts, policymakers and commentators, however, are reluctant
to take section 504 that far. In their view, less effective programs are often
a "neutral" result of physical limitations, not prejudice or its effects, and
therefore the disparate impact model's presumption against unequal ef-
fects must be limited in order to avoid interfering with legitimate inter-
society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality) (dictum) (footnote omitted);
see also Rebell, supra note 23, at 1456, 1452 (claiming there has been no history of dejure discrimi-
nation or animus against people with disabilities comparable to that in race discrimination; instead,
major problems come from lack of awareness or from "neutral" barriers); Wegner, The Antidis-
crimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 429 (1984) (denial of equal
opportunity on the basis of disability often has legitimate factual basis, instead of being motivated by
ill will); Note, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1001 (1984) (Although some
employment barriers are similar to those faced by other minority groups, "[s]ubstantial physical or
mental impairments . . . present disabled persons with a more intractable set of problems.") (foot-
notes omitted).
Section 504 limits its coverage to those who are "otherwise qualified," suggesting a concern that
disability may often be relevant to legitimate program criteria. Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West
Supp. 1988), as amended by Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56
U.S.L.W. 45 (1988) (§ 504) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982), as amended by Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 56 U.S.L.W. 46 (1988) (title VI). See supra notes 11-12.
25. Courts have generally agreed that § 504 prohibits some unequal effects, not merely unequal
treatment. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 297 n.17 (1985).
26. "Reasonable accommodation" is also required by laws prohibiting discrimination based on
religion. See title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982).
27. School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 1131 n.17 (1987) (dictum, discussing employment)
(quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410, 412 (1979)). Courts some-
times use the term "disparate impact" in conjunction with reasonable accommodation by considering
whether § 504 requires accommodations to eliminate adverse impacts. See, e.g., Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. at 299, discussed infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, this use of "dispa-
rate impact" often differs from the race and sex contexts. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
28. See infra Section II-A (discussing frequent changes in disability discrimination doctrine con-
cerning public transportation); Rebell, supra note 23, at 1441.
29. See, e.g., infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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ests.30 Some advocate balancing the interests of people with disabilities
against other interests, rather than presuming unequal effects to be un-
lawful."1 Others take the view that differences make separate programs an
acceptable means of accommodating people with disabilities. 2 This Note,
however, argues that this trend in disability discrimination doctrine is
based on flawed assumptions about the problem of difference, and that a
reexamination of these assumptions will show that an approach based on
the disparate impact model from race and sex discrimination doctrine is
preferable.
B. Feminist Analysis: Uncovering Prejudice
Just as courts and commentators believe that prejudice plays a minor
role in disability discrimination, they have often overlooked much of the
prejudice against women." Feminists, however, have exposed many
problems of prejudice against women that the legal system has largely
ignored or condoned as natural, such as gender bias in the courts, sexual
harassment in the workplace, and wife-battering.34 Insights from feminist
scholarship can improve disability discrimination doctrine by revealing a
pattern of prejudice masked by ideas about difference, a pattern that oper-
ates similarly in both sex discrimination and disability discrimination.35
Feminist theorists have argued that the existence of pervasive prejudice
30. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 514 (facially neutral policies that provide unequal benefits to
people with disabilities, but do not totally deny access to programs, are often based on legitimate
decisions more appropriate to legislative bodies than to courts); Rebell, supra note 23, at 1451-52
("Without some intentionally discriminatory acts to provide a basis for ultimate liability, some further
justification is required to establish why an 'innocent' defendant should be put to the trouble or
expense of changing practices which 'happen' to cause difficulties for the handicapped."); infra notes
84-87 and accompanying text.
31. For example, Attorney Michael Rebell proposes a new "structural accommodation" approach
which essentially involves balancing the needs of people with disabilities against other interests such as
resource limitations, along with setting certain priority areas to guide the balancing process. See
Rebell, supra note 23, at 1455-56. Rebell's structural discrimination approach would probably not
change the outcomes of particular disability discrimination cases recently decided by the Supreme
Court, but would avoid what he perceives as confusing and unprincipled reasoning based on race
discrimination approaches designed for eliminating prejudice. See id. at 1441-52, 1464-70.
32. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 93-95 (regulations permitting segregated public
transportation).
33. For example, Professor John Hart Ely claims that hostility against women is rare. J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 164 (1980). "'Some of my best friends are Negro' got to be a parody of
white hypocrisy, but the best friend of most men really is a woman, which eliminates the real hostility
and fear that persists among the races." Id. at 257 n.94 (emphasis in original).
34. See, e.g., State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467, 693 P.2d 475, 479 (1985) ("[Tlraditional
attitudes have made legal and actual recognition of wife beating's criminal nature slow in coming.").
See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979) (arguing that
sexual harassment has been systematically ignored and instead should be recognized as sex discrimina-
tion). Bias against women in the courts has only recently been examined. See The First Year Report
of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts-June 1984, 9 WOMEN'S
Ris. L. REP. 129, 134 (1986). In a 1983 survey of New Jersey attorneys, 69% of women and 40% of
men reported hearing judges make sexist jokes and remarks hostile to women. Id. at 140. Many
attorneys in the survey thought such behavior influenced the litigation process, and some believed it
affected outcomes of cases. Id. at 141.
35. See infra Section I-C.
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against women has often made recognizing that prejudice difficult. The
more prejudice is routine, the more what is defined as normal and rational
is really prejudice.3 6 Professor Ann Scales contends that in sex discrimina-
tion doctrine, "the 'relevant' differences have been and always will be
those which keep women in their place."13 7 Much of what claims to be
objective or neutral instead expresses a point of view that ignores the per-
spectives of groups subjected to systematic prejudice."8
Prejudice against people with disabilities may similarly be overlooked
or minimized by those not subjected to it. Given the extensive structure of
laws that have enforced the exclusion of people with disabilities from
many areas of society,"9 it is not surprising that prejudice against people
with disabilities is often invisible to many people.
Nevertheless, examples of prejudice abound, as in the race and sex dis-
crimination contexts.40 For example, a writer who has a disability de-
scribes an example of the prejudice that he has encountered: "I was sitting
on a corner several years ago when a carload of teens went by. One kid
yelled out the window, 'Hey, look at that cripple, you guys!' 'Whatsa
matter-can't ya walk?' another shouted. And they sped away laugh-
ing."' 1 A professor who has quadriplegia said, "I have been served meals
in separate dining areas of restaurants since, as the owners were quick to
point out, I might upset the other customers and lessen their enjoyment of
the meal."'42
In addition to overt expressions of hostility, prejudice in the disability
context often takes the form of fear, avoidance or pity.' But these atti-
tudes still serve to deny another's humanity and to assert one's own supe-
riority. Denial or fear of one's own potential disability may increase the
tendency to scapegoat people with disabilities."' "The disabled, then, serve
36. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'Y 635, 654 (1983).
37. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1378
(1986) (footnote omitted).
38. See id. at 1377 (maleness has been made the norm in the name of neutrality); Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 68 (1987)
("Power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes preferences, arranges agendas, and
excludes serious challenges from discussion or even imagination.") (footnote omitted).
39. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
40. For a comparison of prejudice faced by blacks and people with disabilities, see Kriegel, Uncle
Tom and Tiny Tim: Some Reflections on the Cripple as Negro, 38 Am. SCHOLAR 412, 416 (1969)
(both blacks and people with disabilities face society that is uncomfortable with them, and both groups
must struggle for positive identity). Forty-five percent of people with disabilities in the U.S. feel they
are a minority group in the same sense as are blacks and Hispanics. Louis HARRIS & ASSOC., INC.,
supra note 10, at 112.
41. Hooper, The Dignity Thief, DISABILrrY RAG, Jan./Feb. 1988, at 18.
42. Hillam, You Gave Us Your Dimes. . ., NEWSWEEK, Nov. 1, 1976, at 13, quoted in Gittler,
Fair Employment and the Handicapped: A Legal Perspective, 27 DEPAUL L. REV., 953, 969 n.52
(1978).
43. Like open hostility, these more subtle forms of prejudice are likely to encourage designs of
public programs that keep people with disabilities separate and disadvantaged.
44. See F. BOWE, HANDICAPPING AMERICA: BARRIERS TO DISABLED PEOPLE 118-19 (1978); S.
KLEINFIELD, THE HIDDEN MINORITY 182-83 (1977).
1988]
The Yale Law Journal
a useful function in society, making 'normal' persons feel healthier,
brighter, more competent, and secure." '45
Psychologists studying attitudes toward people with disabilities report
widespread prejudice.4  "Studies show that only a bit more than half of
the population of the United States expresses slightly positive attitudes
toward the disabled. The rest openly admit to negative attitudes. They see
the handicapped as different and in some ways inferior to normal
people.' 41
Cultural images often reflect this prejudice by excluding or devaluing
people with disabilities.48 "Not only are disabled characters in fiction [for
example, Captain Hook and Captain Ahab] set apart from others but they
are often cast as villains plotting demented revenge against pristine heroes
or heroines. Physical beauty, in these stories, symbolizes goodness, disabil-
ity evil. ' 49 This evidence of pervasive prejudice against people with disa-
bilities invalidates the assumption that physical differences are the pri-
mary cause of disability discrimination. Instead, this widespread prejudice
has become deeply embedded in "normal" social institutions and concepts,
including traditional ideas about physical differences.
C. Rethinking Difference: Critique of the Male Norm Applied to the
Able-bodied Norm
Like disability discrimination theory, sex discrimination theory has
struggled with the issue of how to deal with physical differences. Some
theorists advocate a "special treatment" approach to sex differences." The
special treatment approach is similar to "reasonable accommodation" in
45. Eisenberg, Disability as Stigma, in DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS 5 (M.
Eisenberg, C. Griggins & R. Duval eds. 1982).
46. One study showed that a visible disability had a greater negative influence than racial differ-
ences on children's preferences for other children. Richardson & Royce, Race and Physical Handicap
in Children's Preference for Other Children, 39 CHILD DEV. 467 (1968), cited in Safilios-
Rothschild, Social and Psychological Parameters of Friendship and Intimacy for Disabled People, in
DISABLED PEOPLE AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS, supra note 45, at 43.
47. S. KLEINFIELD, supra note 44, at 173 (quoting Harold Yuker, Professor of Psychology at
Hofstra University).
48. See Kriegel, supra note 40, at 426 (society values an occasionally bizarre sense of physical
beauty unattainable by people with disabilities); A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NA-
TURE 40-48 (1983) (criticizing predominant western philosophical image of humans as independent,
rational beings free from biological needs).
49. F. BOWE, supra note 44, at 109. Some seemingly positive images also express harmful stereo-
types. Famous people with disabilities, such as Helen Keller, are often portrayed in an unrealistic
way that suggests that all people with disabilities are superhuman beings who are expected to "over-
come" their disabilities. See id. at 111. Fundraising telethons featuring children with disabilities can
perpetuate stereotypes of people with disabilities as childlike and dependent on charity. See id. at 110.
50. See, e.g., Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action
and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 513 (1983) (supporting state
statute giving women special treatment by requiring job security for women unable to work because of
pregnancy-related disability); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955
(1984) (arguing that sex discrimination doctrine should depart from equal treatment approach in
analyzing laws governing women's reproductive biology).
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its assumption that at least some of women's disadvantages relative to men
stem not from prejudice, but from sex differences, such as women's ability
to become pregnant.51 Special treatment advocates argue that equality for
women requires some different treatment (pregnancy leave, for example)
in recognition of real sex differences, not simply equal treatment of men
and women.52
Other feminist theorists argue, however, that instead of attempting to
distinguish real from stereotypical differences, equality doctrine should
challenge the male-biased norms that make difference, including physical
differences, a problem for women. 53 As Professor Martha Minow has ob-
served, biased standards are at the source of the confusion about how
equality doctrine should deal with the differences of disability as well as
gender. 5 '
Professor Catharine MacKinnon criticizes traditional equality doctrine
for giving women a choice of either being like men with the equal treat-
ment approach or different from men with special treatment. 5 Either
way, women lose because men are the standard against which women are
measured.58 Ending gender inequality requires eliminating this male stan-
dard underlying both equal treatment and special treatment. Professor
Wendy Williams argues that pregnancy does not create "special" needs
requiring different treatment, but rather exemplifies basic human needs.5"
Similarly, in terming the physical needs of people with disabilities "dif-
ferent," "special," and in need of "accommodation," society implies that
able-bodied people are the norm, and that people with disabilities are the
deviations .5  Able-bodied people are not considered "different." 9
51. In fact, special treatment advocates have claimed that the reasonable accommodation approach
to disability discrimination is a model of a successful special treatment approach to equality. See
Krieger & Cooney, supra note 50, at 559-60; Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690, 717-18 (1983). In contrast, critics of special treatment argue
that reasonable accommodation is not a good model for sex discrimination doctrine because it is an
approach that has required only limited changes. See Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More
than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation from the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 825, 833-34 (1985).
52. See Krieger & Cooney, supra note 50. Critics of special treatment fear that any different
treatment of women may reinforce harmful stereotypes of women. See, e.g., Williams, Equality's Rid-
dle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
53. See C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DiscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 32-45
(1987); Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace
Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1152-59 (1986); Scales, supra note 37, at 1380-83; Taub &
Williams, supra note 51, at 834-36.
54. See Minow, supra note 38, at 31-57.
55. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 53, at 33.
56. See id. at 34.
57. Williams, supra note 52, at 327.
58. See Taub & Williams, supra note 51, at 834; Minow, supra note 38, at 32.
59. "[T]he very claim to knowledge manifested by the labeling of any group as different ...
disguises the act of power by which the namers simultaneously assign names and deny their relation-
ships with, and power over, the named." Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for
the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
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This view fails to recognize that disability is normal. The needs of peo-
ple with disabilities, such as the need for ramps instead of stairs, are basic
human needs shared by large numbers of people."0 All people have physi-
cal limitations, and all can expect to have more disabilities as they grow
older. The labels "able-bodied" and "disabled" only approximate the
wide range of human physical activity. Most people are "disabled" com-
pared to professional athletes or opera singers.6" An able-bodied norm is
incorrect not only because it implies that disability is unusual, but because
it also suggests that disability is inherently deviant and abnormal in a
normative sense."2 Disability, however, is not a characteristic that should
stigmatize a person or detract from her value as a human being. 3
It is common to think of the problems of disability, like the problems of
pregnancy, as caused purely by physiology. For example, if a wheelchair
user cannot get up the stairs of a bus, that problem seems to be "caused"
by her disability. Many people with disabilities argue, however, that they
are burdened primarily by society, not by their disability. 4 A society
L. REV. 111, 128 (1987).
60. A 1986 survey estimated that there were about 27 million people with disabilities over age 16
in the United States. See Louis HARRIS & AsSOC., INC., supra note 10, at iii.
61. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 206 (D.N.H. 1981), quoted in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 89-90.
62. "[T]here is something inherent in the concept of a standard for assessment that views the
standard as the norm, and everything that is dissimilar from the standard as the deviate 'other.' 'Dif-
ferent' and 'other' consequently have pejorative connotations . . . ." Finley, supra note 53, at 1153
(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
63. Although an able-bodied standard currently may seem objective and legitimate, this perception
probably is influenced by bias. Traditionally, "maleness" and "whiteness" were similarly assumed to
be objective standards for the most valued human traits. See, e.g., K. MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 258
n.66 (1969) (criticizing Freud, Aquinas, and Augustine for their views of women as imperfect men).
An able-bodied norm may seem appropriate in the sense that even in an ideal social environment,
most individuals, given the choice, would probably choose not to have any particular disability. See
Mairs, On Being a Cripple, in WITH WINGS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY AND ABOUT
WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES 127 (M. Saxton & F. Howe eds. 1987) ("[Having a disability] has
opened and enriched my life enormously. . . . All the same, if a cure were found, would I take it? In
a minute. . . . I'd take a cure; I just don't need one."). It does not follow, however, that people who
do have disabilities are abnormal or inferior, or that laws and social structures should incorporate an
able-bodied standard.
Special treatment advocates often fear that by requiring pregnancy to be treated the same as disabil-
ities, laws such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), imply that preg-
nancy is abnormal and dysfunctional, not a normal phase in a women's life. See, e.g., Scales, Towards
a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 429 (1981). A better approach would be to treat both
pregnancy and disability as normal human events.
64. Most disabled people feel that the disability itself, the pain, the need for compensatory
devices and assistance can produce considerable inconvenience, but that very often these be-
come minimal or are forgotten once the individual makes the transition to everyday life. But
the discriminatory attitudes and thoughtless behaviors, these are what make life difficult, these
are the sources of the oppression.
Living in These Bodies, These Minds, in WITH WINGS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF LITERATURE BY AND
ABOUT WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 63, at 3; see also Achtenberg, Law and the Physi-
cally Disabled: An Update with Constitutional Implications, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 847, 848 (1976)
("More people are forced into limited lives and made to suffer by these man-made obstacles than by
any specific physical or mental disability.") (footnote omitted); tenBroek, The Right to Live in the
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966) (public attitudes play
greater role than physical limitations in determining access of people with disabilities to public
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where childbearing women were considered typical workers would have
workplace policies and social structures that would prevent pregnancy
from impairing a woman's ability to work.65 Similarly, a society where
people who have trouble climbing stairs were considered part of the group
of typical transportation users might design buses with ramps and low
floors as a matter of course.6" In such a society, a physical inability to
climb stairs would not be a disadvantage to a person seeking access to
public transportation.
II. REGULATIONS GOVERNING DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
A. Conflicting Views of Equality in Previous Regulations
The federal regulations implementing section 504 in public transporta-
tion show a history of frequent changes, documenting the controversy
about the meaning of disability discrimination. The first Department of
Transportation (DOT) regulations implementing section 504, issued in
1976, treat the transportation needs of people with disabilities as a largely
optional and extra task. 7 These rules required local transit agencies re-
ceiving federal funds to make "special efforts" to serve people with disa-
bilities, but to a great extent the rules let local transit agencies decide the
specific form and extent of these "special efforts." 6
In 1979, DOT replaced these regulations with new rules.69 Instead of
places); Shut In, Shut Out, Shut Up-Surviving the System, in WITH THE POWER OF EACH BREATH:
A DISABLED WOMEN'S ANTHOLOGY 13 (S. Browne, D. Connors & N. Stern eds. 1985) ("We are
disabled more by barriers of access than from the specific conditions of our body.").
65. See Williams, supra note 52, at 364.
66. "Side-walk curbs are not neutral or natural, but humanly constructed, obstacles." Minow,
supra note 38, at 14 n.19.
Technology is one social factor that shapes the effect of physical differences. Contraception and safe,
legal abortion have changed the effects of women's reproductive differences. Similarly, new designs for
wheelchairs, lifts, and buses can give wheelchair users greater mobility. In the past, DOT transporta-
tion engineers and planners commonly viewed the problems of people with disabilities as social service
concerns outside their domain. R. KATZMANN, supra note 13, at 89. These attitudes undoubtedly
contributed to the lack of research on making buses accessible to people using wheelchairs.
67. See Urban Transportation Programing for Elderly and Handicapped Persons, 41 Fed. Reg.
18,234 (1976). These rules and subsequent DOT rules were issued pursuant to the Urban Mass
Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1612(a) (1982), and the Federal-Aid High-
way Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1982), in addition to § 504.
68. In an appendix, the regulations gave three examples of satisfactory "special efforts" with
respect to people using wheelchairs: (1) spending a minimum proportion of federal aid on wheelchair-
accessible service; (2) buying only wheelchair-accessible buses until one-half of the vehicles in the
system were accessible, or providing a comparable substitute service for wheelchair users; (3) estab-
lishing a system of individual subsidies so that every wheelchair user could purchase ten round trips
per week from any accessible service at prices equal to "regular fares." Urban Transportation
Programing for Elderly and Handicapped Persons, 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976). These examples were
simply illustrative, not mandatory minimum requirements. Id. Although these examples of "special
efforts," if followed, would somewhat improve service for people with disabilities, they imply that
providing transportation to people with disabilities is a special problem separate from "normal" trans-
portation programs.
69. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally-Assisted Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442 (1979).
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the "special efforts" approach, these new rules adopted an equal access
approach, which incorporated the assumption that mass transit should
normally be designed to meet the needs of both people with disabilities
and nondisabled people. DOT made this change in response to rules is-
sued in 1978 by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW), which had authority to coordinate other agencies' implementa-
tion of section 504.'0 The HEW guidelines required federally funded pro-
grams to be accessible, as a whole, to people with disabilities.71
Following HEW's guidelines, DOT's 1979 rules required all new fixed
route buses to be accessible to people with disabilities, including those us-
ing wheelchairs. 2 Within three years, or ten years for modifying existing
vehicles or facilities or making expensive structural changes, transit sys-
tems had to make at least one half of peak-hour bus service accessible. 3
The equal access goal of the 1979 rules did not last long. In 1981,
American Public Transit Association (APTA) v. Lewis 4 held that a sec-
tion of the rules governing specific requirements for mass transit was be-
yond the scope of DOT's authority under section 504 because it mandated
expensive structural changes.75 The D.C. Circuit based its decision in this
case on Southeastern Community College v. Davis,7 16 the Supreme Court's
first decision interpreting section 504's substantive requirements. Davis
upheld a nursing program's rejection of an applicant with impaired hear-
ing, holding that section 504 does not require substantial modifications of
programs to accommodate people with disabilities. 7
APTA and Davis were incorrect, however, in characterizing substantial
modifications for people with disabilities as burdensome affirmative steps
70. See Implementation of Executive Order 11,914, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap
in Federally Assisted Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978) (redesignated and currently codified, with
amendments, at 28 C.F.R. § 41 (1987)). After the 1979 DOT rules were overturned (see infra text
accompanying notes 74-75), the Department of Justice, which replaced HEW as the agency with
coordinating authority for § 504, suspended the application of these guideline regulations to transpor-
tation. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs-Suspension
of Guidelines with Respect to Mass Transportation, 46 Fed. Reg. 40,687 (1981).
71. The rules required new facilities to be readily accessible to people with disabilities, but did
not necessarily require structural changes in existing facilities as long as the program "when viewed
in its entirety is readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons." 43 Fed. Reg. at 2138-39.
The HEW rules were influenced by HEW staff who used racial equality legislation as a model,
and also by substantial lobbying and protest activities, including the occupation of HEW Secretary
Califano's office by disability rights organizations. See R. KATZMANN, supra note 13, at 99-102.
72. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 31,478.
73. Id.
74. 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
75. APTA admitted that § 504 may require programs to make some accommodations for people
with disabilities, but refused to interpret § 504 to require costly accommodations. See id. at 1278.
76. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
77. See id. at 409-14. The Court did not define "substantial modification," but held that § 504
does not require a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program, such as eliminating clinical
courses for a nursing student. See id. at 409-10. The Court failed to recognize, however, that a
program's traditional nature is likely to be shaped by able-bodied bias, see infra Section II-B, given
society's tradition of exclusion and prejudice based on disability, see supra notes 2-10, 40-49 and
accompanying text.
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outside the scope of a nondiscrimination requirement. 8 Prejudice shapes
the perception that the needs of people with disabilities are "extra" needs
above and beyond the norm, and that meeting these needs is a form of
preferential treatment. Instead, major changes may be necessary to correct
the history of exclusion of people with disabilities from many benefits
generally available to nondisabled people. 9 For years, people with disa-
bilities have paid taxes that have funded public transportation programs
designed exclusively for nondisabled people.80 Professor MacKinnon de-
scribes American society as an affirmative action plan for white men;81
society could similarly be described as an affirmative action plan for able-
bodied people. Without an understanding that inaccessible transportation
is a matter of prejudice, not just natural differences, however, lawmakers
are not likely to favor major changes such as those imposed by the 1979
rules.
As a result of APTA, DOT withdrew the challenged section of the
1979 regulations and substituted "interim final regulations" with require-
ments for bus systems similar to the vague "special efforts" rules of
1976.82 Taking the view that these rules would not result in enough ac-
cess, Congress responded by passing a statute requiring DOT to promptly
issue final rules that would establish clear minimum standards for accessi-
ble transportation service.83
Before DOT issued these final rules, the Supreme Court again consid-
ered the extent of accommodations required by section 504. In Alexander
v. Choate,8" the Court refused to limit section 504 to a simple equal treat-
ment requirement, but left unanswered questions about when section 504
will forbid unequal effects. The Court assumed that section 504 may in
some situations require accommodations to eliminate disparate impacts,85
but decided that policies with harmful effects on people with disabilities
may be lawful if "meaningful and equal access" still exists.86 The court
78. See APTA, 655 F.2d at 1277; Davis, 442 U.S. at 410-13.
79. For some examples of this exclusion, see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
80. Although many people with disabilities are not employed, a significant number have earned
incomes and thus presumably have paid taxes. One 1978 study found that of the people with disabili-
ties who have difficulty using public transportation, 1,141,000 are employed. GREY ADVERTISING,
supra note 13, at 18.
81. C. MACKINNON, supra note 53, at 36.
82. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,488 (1981) (replacing 49
C.F.R. §§ 27.81-107 (Subpart E) with a new section at 49 C.F.R. § 27.77 (Subpart D)).
83. See § 317(c) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1612(c)
(1982); 128 CONG. REC. 30,825 (1982) (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
84. 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (reducing number of annual inpatient hospital days covered under state
Medicaid program was not unlawful discrimination despite adverse effects on people with
disabilities).
85. Id. at 299.
86. Id. at 302-06. Although the Court did not clearly define "meaningful and equal access," it
explained that the Medicaid policy challenged in the case "is neutral on its face, is not alleged to rest
on a discriminatory motive, and does not deny the handicapped access to or exclude them from the
particular package of Medicaid services Tennessee has chosen to provide." Id. at 309.
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feared that "[blecause the handicapped typically are not similarly situated
to the nonhandicapped," the disparate impact approach in some situations
could lead to "a wholly unwieldy administrative and adjudicative
burden."' 7
Professor Minow notes, however, that fears about the unmanageability
of considering "different" needs may stem from a biased perspective.8 A
society that fails to consider the needs of people with disabilities will be
unmanageable for people with disabilities. 9 Considering effects of policies
on people with disabilities should not be presumed more troublesome than
considering effects of policies on nondisabled people.
B. Able-Bodied Bias in the 1986 Regulations
DOT issued final rules governing bus systems in 1986.90 In these rules,
the able-bodied bias common throughout much of disability discrimination
law persists. The rules imply that the general purpose of public transpor-
tation is to serve nondisabled people; service to people with disabilities is a
special accommodation. For example, the rules describe inaccessible buses
as buses serving the "general public."'" Buses serving wheelchair users
are "special service" vehicles.92
The 1986 rules give local transit agencies the choice of using a separate
"special service" system or a mixed system as a substitute for making bus
systems accessible. 3 A majority of public comments to DOT from people
with disabilities criticized the special service option on the ground that it
would result in segregation and inferior service.9 4 Nevertheless, DOT de-
87. Id. at 298.
88. Minow, supra note 38, at 52.
89. See id.
90. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in the Department of Transportation Financial
Assistance Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,994 (1986) [hereinafter DOT Rules] (codified at 49 C.F.R. §
27 (1987)). This Note's discussion of the 1986 DOT rules will focus on 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.81-.103
(Subpart E). The general provisions on program accessibility in Subpart C, which originally were
part of the 1979 rules, were not at issue in APTA and remain in effect in the current rules, with some
amendments. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.61-.67 (1987) (Subpart C, requiring programs in their entirety to
be accessible). No court has yet decided the issue of the relationship between Subpart E and Subpart
C. Cf. Disabled in Action v. Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113 (3d Cir. 1987) (subway renovations must meet
requirements in Subpart C in addition to those in Subpart D).
91. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 27.95 (1987).
92. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.95(b) (1987). This bias is similar to the inequality of the sex-segregated
school system in Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by equally divided
court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). The public high school for boys only was named "Central High," while
the high school for girls was named "Girls High." Id. at 881.
93. The special service system is characterized by smaller vehicles, "demand-responsive service,
point of origin to point of destination service, and flexible routing and scheduling." 49 C.F.R. § 27.5
(1987).
94. DOT Rules, supra note 90, at 19,004. Proponents of the "special service" option stress the
advantages of individualized service. Opponents emphasize several disadvantages: "special service"
requires planning trips ahead of time because of a waiting period of up to 24 hours, see 49 C.F.R. §
27.95(b)(2) (1987); it precludes travel with nondisabled friends because eligibility is restricted to those
unable to use the regular bus service, see 49 C.F.R. § 27.95(b)(1) (1987); and people may be stigma-
tized by being relegated to a separate system.
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cided that these concerns were outweighed by other interests, such as the
value of local decisionmaking."5 Freedom from government regulation,
however, may mean the freedom to act based on prejudice, and should not
necessarily be treated as a legitimate interest to be balanced against inter-
ests in equality.96
The rules establish minimum service requirements governing fares,
area and time of service, restrictions on eligibility and trip purpose, and
waiting periods. 7 Under these rules, service for people with disabilities
must generally be "comparable" to service for nondisabled people, but can
still be somewhat inferior.9"
The rules balance these service requirements against the transit agen-
cies' interests in minimizing cost. A cost cap provision exempts a transit
agency from the required minimum levels of accessible service if it spends
three percent of its annual operating budget on service for people with
disabilities.99 DOT claims that this cost limit on required accommodations
will prevent undue burdens that are beyond its authority to impose under
section 504, particularly in light of APTA, while still requiring improved
service for people with disabilities.1"0
A federal district court recently decided, however, that this cost cap is
unlawful.'' The court held that the cost limit nullified Congress's man-
date for minimum standards 0 2 by allowing transit agencies to avoid com-
plying with the service requirements." 3 This decision is being appealed,
and during the appeal all parts of the 1986 rules remain in effect.
The cost cap demonstrates able-bodied bias: The costs of the existing
system are normal and acceptable, while the costs incurred by meeting the
needs of people with disabilities are different and burdensome, subject to a
three percent cost limit. The cost limit provision fails to question costs of
meeting the needs of nondisabled people, even though these costs may be
equally, or more, burdensome. For example, seats in buses often cost more
95. See DOT Rules, supra note 90, at 19,004; see also Americans Disabled for Accessible Pub.
Transp. (ADAPT) v. Dole, 676 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (rejecting challenge to the special
service option).
96. See Memorandum for Plaintiffs' ADAPT in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
at 80-81, ADAPT v. Dole, 676 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (comparing "local option" for separate
bus service to "freedom of choice" school desegregation plan struck down in race discrimination case).
97. 49 C.F.R. § 27.95 (1987).
98. For example, under the service requirements, "special service" fares of SI.50 would likely be
comparable to S.80 bus fares. 49 C.F.R. § 27 app. at 225 (1987). Accessible bus systems must provide
service at "reasonable intervals" throughout the same days and hours as service for the "general
public," but all buses need not be accessible. Id. at 226.
99. 49 C.F.R. § 27.97 (1987).
100. See DOT Rules, supra note 90, at 18,998, 19,011-13.
101. ADAPT v. Dole, 676 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
102. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1612(c) (1982); supra text accompanying note 83.
103. See ADAPT v. Dole, 676 F. Supp. at 641-42. In addition, the court found the cost cap
arbitrary because DOT studies showed small cities choosing the special service option would rarely be
able to meet the service criteria within the spending limit. Id. at 642.
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than wheelchair securement devices.104 Moreover, the cost cap perpetuates
past prejudice. Those transit agencies that have made few efforts toward
accessible transit are most likely to incur the greatest expenses in improv-
ing access and thus most likely to meet the cost cap.105
The 1986 rules have a biased view of benefits as well as costs. Modifi-
cations designed to make buses accessible to people with disabilities may
benefit all riders in ways that offset the costs. For example, in the 1970's
DOT advocated the accessible low-floored Transbus as a design that
would benefit all riders.108 Low floors and ramps instead of stairs would
be better for many people, such as small children, elderly people, and
parents with babies in strollers. In spite of these potential benefits, how-
ever, the 1986 rules generally treat costs of accommodations as
burdensome. 07
In sum, the DOT regulations, both past and present, embody the biased
view that making public transit accessible to people with disabilities is an
act of charity to a special, separate group whose needs are often unman-
ageable. Instead, accessible public transit should be considered an ordi-
nary service that benefits the public.
III. REAFFIRMING THE DISPARATE IMPACT MODEL
Subtle and pervasive able-bodied bias, not simply physical difference,
leads to the socioeconomic disadvantages that attach to physical disability.
Thinking about the problem as an issue of eliminating prejudice rather
than simply accommodating difference would improve disability discrimi-
nation doctrine.1 08
Disability discrimination doctrine should confront the prejudice that
makes the "differences" related to disability seem like abnormal, separate
problems that are necessarily disadvantageous. Instead of approving spe-
cial, segregated services, courts and policymakers should follow the dispa-
rate impact model, which generally requires that unjustified policies with
harmful effects be changed as a whole, rather than remedied through sep-
104. Wheelchair securement devices commonly used in public buses cost approximately S85. Tele-
phone interview with Peter Zarba, J. Bussani, Inc.-Adaptive Driving Equipment (Jan. 18, 1988).
Two-passenger seats used by one bus company cost roughly $575. Telephone interview with Jim
Miller, Parts Dep't, Flxible Corp. (Feb. 8, 1988).
105. See Note, Section 504 Transportation Regulations: Molding Civil Rights Legislation to
Meet the Realities of Economic Constraints, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 558, 581 (1987).
106. See R. KATZMANN, supra note 13, at 133. The Transbus design had wide doors and low
floors that could be fitted with ramps to provide wheelchair access. Id. at 133-34.
107. The rules do recognize to some extent that separately counting costs of service to people with
disabilities can be problematic. Calculations of cost may not include "the cost of items that generally
improve the [transit system's] entire service to the public." 49 C.F.R. § 27 app. at 229-30 (1987).
108. In its most recent decision on § 504, School Bd. v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987), the
Supreme Court appropriately focused on the importance of recognizing and eliminating prejudice in
its decision that a person with tuberculosis is covered under § 504's definition of "handicap." The
Court has not adequately extended this recognition of prejudice to other issues, however, such as the
extent of accommodations required under § 504.
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arate policies targeted at the adversely affected groups."0 9 Consistent with
the disparate impact model's treatment of race and sex discrimination,110
the law should adopt a presumption that a program's adverse effects on
people with disabilities are discriminatory. Disability discrimination doc-
trine should not assume that public programs can normally be designed to
be more effective for nondisabled people than for people with disabilities
as long as programs make some accommodations or do not completely ex-
clude people with disabilities. 11
Presuming that programs should be equally effective for both people
with disabilities and able-bodied people does not necessarily preclude con-
sideration of competing interests such as cost savings.112 Simply balancing
concerns such as cost against the interest of people with disabilities in
access to public programs," 3 however, is inappropriate because these con-
cerns are likely to incorporate able-bodied biases." Instead, the disparate
impact model's presumption of equal effects should be used to encourage
careful scrutiny of justifications for adverse effects to ferret out bias." 5
Several requirements would minimize subtle prejudice in assessing the
costs of making programs equally effective for people with disabilities. 1 6
First, courts and policymakers should carefully examine actual evidence of
costs of making programs fully accessible. Estimates of the cost of provid-
109. See Williams, supra note 52, at 364-65.
110. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 30, 84-87 and accompanying text; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,
298-99 (1985) (refusing to apply disparate impact doctrine to some situations of adverse impacts
under § 504). The variety in the types and severity of disabilities can complicate consideration of
adverse affects. Nevertheless, if consideration of needs of people with disabilities became normal and
not exceptional, it is likely that this process would generally be routine, not burdensome.
112. Despite general agreement among courts and commentators that § 504 allows costs to be
taken into account, there is conflict over when, if ever, cost concerns justify inaccessible or ineffective
programs. See Cook, The Scope of the Right to Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Bur-
dens Under Disability Civil Rights Laws, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1471 (1987) (cost cannot abrogate
meaningful access). This Note does not directly address this issue, but instead simply seeks to suggest
ways of minimizing bias when cost is considered.
113. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
114. Prejudice may distort lawmakers' decisions, for example, by causing them to weigh costs to
one group heavily, while devaluing or ignoring costs to groups who are underrepresented in the politi-
cal process. See J. ELY, supra note 33, at 153-58; see also Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 347-49 (1987) (unconscious
biases cause similar political process distortions).
115. Even though the disparate impact doctrine has resulted in significant gains in race and sex
discrimination cases, courts often use disparate impact in a restrictive way that leaves subtle race and
gender biases in place. See, e.g., Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, 568 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1977) (height
requirement for airline pilots that adversely affected women justified because cockpit designed for
pilots of that height); Bartholet, Application of Title VII toJobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV.
945, 967-78 (1982) (courts have often failed to apply strict standard of justification to defenses of
practices with disparate effect on women or minorities in upper level jobs); Note, Getting Women
Work That Isn't Women's Work: Extending Title VII to Eliminate Gender Bias in the Workplace, 97
YALE L.J. (forthcoming 1988) (courts' current use of disparate impact doctrine fails to remedy many
male biases in employment).
116. For an example of a regulation with some requirements for careful scrutiny of justifications
for inaccessible transportation, see MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
REGULATIONS RELATING TO HANDICAP DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC CONVEYANCES, Part III-E
(1987) ("undue burden" exceptions to accommodation requirement).
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ing access to programs such as public transportation often vary widely,"'7
and in many cases may actually be minimal. 18 For instance, in one case,
the cost of wheelchair-accessible buses was comparable to that of the inac-
cessible buses the city had bought."'
Second, the contribution of past discrimination to current high costs
should be considered. Cutbacks in service for able-bodied people may be
justified because of past burdens imposed on people with disabilities and
because policymakers refused to design programs that would have been
accessible in the first instance. 20 Third, less costly alternatives should be
carefully investigated 121 in consultation with disability rights groups.1 2
Fourth, cost should be treated similarly for both people with disabilities
and nondisabled people.'2 For example, to save costs, agencies should not
simply limit service for people with disabilities, but should make cuts
which equivalently affect people with disabilities and nondisabled
people.' 24
IV. CONCLUSION
By incorporating the erroneous perception that the problem is one of
addressing "different" needs, disability discrimination law remains con-
fused and only partially successful. A closer look reveals that prejudice
against people with disabilities is widespread. This prejudice fosters the
perception that the particular needs of people with disabilities are necessa-
rily "different" and disadvantageous. By using strategies from race and
sex discrimination doctrine designed to address subtle prejudice and its
effects, disability discrimination doctrine can better ensure that federally
funded programs are effective for all people, not just those who are able-
bodied.
117. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 79-80. Benefits, such as increased
numbers of riders, may offset costs. A study for DOT at one time estimated over $800 million in
annual benefits to the public from eliminating transportation barriers. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAVEL BARRIERS 19 (1970), cited in Reed, Equal Access to Mass Trans-
portation for the Handicapped, 9 TRANSP. L.J. 167, 171 (1977).
118. In a 1987 survey, 75% of managers said the average cost of employing a person with a
disability is about the same as the cost of employing a nondisabled person. Louis HARRIS & ASSOC.,
INC., STUDY No. 864009, THE ICD SURVEY II: EMPLOYING DISABLED AMERICANS 9 (1987).
119. See Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. City of S. Portland, 508 A.2d 948, 952 & n.3 (Me.
1986).
120. See supra text accompanying note 105.
121. In title VII cases, some courts interpret the disparate impact approach to require a search for
less harmful alternatives as part of the defendant's burden of justifying a policy that adversely affects
a protected group. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1971). This
requirement is an appropriate and useful means of reaching subtle bias that often results in lack of
concern about possibilities for meeting "different" needs.
122. The 1986 DOT rules take some steps in this direction by requiring public participation in
transit agencies' plans. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.83 (1987).
123. In contrast, the 1986 rules separately limit the cost of improving service for people with
disabilities. See supra text accompanying notes 99-107.
124. See Wegner, supra note 24, at 507 (criticizing cost-efficiency defenses where people with
disabilities alone bear their own costs of receiving services).
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